Current account dynamics and monetary policy by Andrea Ferrero et al.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This paper was produced under the 
auspices of the Center for Pacific Basin Studies within the Economic Research 
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
 
 
Current Account Dynamics  
and Monetary Policy  
 
Andrea Ferrero 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
 
Mark Gertler 
New York University 
 




























Prepared for the NBER conference on "International Dimensions of Monetary Policy" in Girona (Spain),
June 2007. The authors are grateful to Paolo Pesenti, Gianluca Benigno and Luca Dedola for their
discussions and to participants at several conferences for helpful comments. Gertler thanks the NSF
and the Guggenheim Foundation for financial support. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the Federal Reserve System, the Sveriges Riksbank, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2008 by Andrea Ferrero, Mark Gertler, and Lars E.O. Svensson. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Current Account Dynamics and Monetary Policy
Andrea Ferrero, Mark Gertler, and Lars E.O. Svensson




We explore the implications of current account adjustment for monetary policy within a simple two-
country DSGE model. Our framework nests Obstfeld and Rogoff's (2005) static model of exchange
rate responsiveness to current account reversals. It extends this approach by endogenizing the dynamic
adjustment path and by incorporating production and nominal price rigidities in order to study the
role of monetary policy. We consider two different adjustment scenarios. The first is a "slow burn"
where the adjustment of the current account deficit of the home country is smooth and slow. The second
is a "fast burn" where, owing to a sudden shift in expectations of relative growth rates, there is a rapid
reversal of the home country's current account. We examine several different monetary policy regimes
under each of these scenarios. Our principal finding is that the behavior of the domestic variables (for
instance, output, inflation) is quite sensitive to the monetary regime, while the behavior of the international
variables (for instance, the current account and the real exchange rate) is less so. Among different
policy rules, domestic inflation targeting achieves the best stabilization outcome of aggregate variables.
This result is robust to the presence of imperfect pass-through on import prices, although in this case
stabilization of consumer price inflation performs similarly well.
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A salient feature of the global economy is the emergence of signiﬁcant global imbalances over
the past decade, reﬂected principally by the large current account deﬁcit of the U.S. with the
rest of the world portrayed in the top panel of ﬁgure 1. There has been considerable debate
over the sources of these imbalances as well as over the implications they may have for future
economic behavior. Perhaps most notably, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005) (henceforth OR)
argue that, regardless of origins of the recent U.S. current account deﬁcit, a correction of this
imbalance will require a real depreciation of the dollar on the order of thirty percent. While
there is far from universal agreement with the OR hypothesis, the slide in the dollar over the
past several years (bottom panel of ﬁgure 1) is certainly consistent with their scenario.
Despite the recent discussions about current account imbalances and exchange rates, much
less attention has been paid to the implications for monetary policy. At ﬁr s tb l u s h ,i tm a y
seem that any connection with monetary policy is at best indirect. Given that the U.S.
current account deﬁcit ultimately reﬂects saving/investment diﬀerences with the rest of the
world, monetary policy management cannot be assigned any direct responsibility. Similarly,
the adjustment of real exchange rates to correct these imbalances is beyond the direct province
of monetary policy.
Nonetheless, while monetary policy is arguably not the cause of current account deﬁcits
and surpluses, there are potentially important implications of these imbalances for the man-
agement of monetary policy. For example, to the extent that OR are correct about the
adjustment of exchanges rates, the depreciation of the dollar is potentially a source of inﬂa-
tionary pressure. To be sure, in the long run inﬂation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon
and even in a global environment, the Federal Reserve retains full control over its mone-
tary policy. Nonetheless, as Rogoﬀ (2007) has suggested, movements in international relative
prices may inﬂuence short-run inﬂation dynamics. In the case of current account adjustment,
any associated depreciation may force the central bank into choosing between maintaining
price stability or output at potential. That is, even if the current account adjustment plays
out smoothly, the depreciation of the dollar may induce extra pressure on CPI inﬂation for
a period of time that can only be oﬀset by tightening of monetary policy, with potential
repercussions for real activity.
Further, even if unlikely, it is not inconceivable that there might be a quick reversal of the
U.S. current account, perhaps in response to some adverse news about the long-run growth
prospects of the U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world. Under this “sudden stop”
1scenario, there would likely be a rapid depreciation of the dollar along with a sharp contraction
in domestic spending required to bring the current account into line. These rapid and large
adjustments could potentially create a complex balancing act for the Federal Reserve. Even
if such a circumstance is remote, it is certainly worth exploring policy options under this kind
of worst-case scenario.
In this paper, accordingly, we explore the implications of current account imbalances for
monetary policy. To do so, we develop a simple two-country monetary DSGE model. The
framework nests the static endowment world economy that OR used to study the link between
the current account and exchange rates. To this framework, we add explicit dynamics and
consider production decisions under nominal rigidities. The end product is a framework where
the current account, exchange rates and both output and inﬂa t i o nw i t h i ne a c hc o u n t r ya r e
determined endogenously. The behavior of each economy, further, depends on the monetary
policy decisions of each country. We then use the model to study how diﬀerent monetary
policies aﬀect aggregate economic behavior in light of current account developments.
We model the current account imbalance as the product of cross-country diﬀerences in
expected productivity growth as well as diﬀerences in saving propensities, the two main factors
typically cited as underlying the recent situation.1 We initialize the model to approximately
match the recent U.S. current account deﬁcit, which is roughly ﬁv ep e r c e n to fG D P .T h e
expected depreciation the model predicts is then very close to the thirty percent estimate of
OR. This is not entirely surprising since the way we calibrate our model is very consistent
with OR’s approach. In this regard, we stress that our goal is not to establish whether or
not OR’s forecast is correct. Rather, it is to consider various monetary policy strategies
in an environment where current imbalances do exert pressures on the domestic economy
o ft h et y p eO Re n v i s i o n . P u td i ﬀerently, what we are engaged in should be regarded as
“war-gaming” diﬀerent scenarios that could prove challenging for monetary policy.
We consider two main scenarios. The ﬁrst we refer to as the “slow burn.” In this case
the current account adjustment plays out slowly and smoothly. There are no major shocks
along the way. Nonetheless, the steady depreciation of the dollar places persistent pressures
on CPI inﬂation. In the second scenario, “the fast burn,” there is a reversal of the current
account deﬁcit that plays out over the course of year. We model the reversal as a revision in
1To be clear, we model diﬀerences in consumption/saving propensiti e sa sp r e f e r e n c e ss h o c k st h a ta r em e a n t
to be a catch-all for factors that could cause diﬀerences in national savings rates such as ﬁscal policies,
demographics and capital market frictions. For recent analyses of current account behavior, see for example
Engel and Rogers (2006), Backus et al. (2006), Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2007), Ferrero (2007),
Faruquee et al. (2005), and Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007).
2beliefs about future productivity growth in the home country relative to the foreign country.
Under each scenario, we consider the implications of diﬀerent monetary policies for the home
and foreign countries.
There has been other work that examines monetary policies under diﬀerent scenarios for
current account adjustment. Several authors, for example, have employed the large scale
GEM developed by the IMF exactly for this purpose (e.g. Faruquee et al., forthcoming).2
We diﬀer by restricting attention to a small scale model, with the aim of developing a set
of qualitative results. Thus, we abstract from many of the frictions present in the GEM
framework that help tightly ﬁt the data. Instead, we incorporate a relatively minimal set of
frictions with the aim of a balance between facilitating qualitative analysis and at the same
time permitting the model to generate quantitative predictions that are “in the ball park.”
In section 2 we develop the basic model. It is a variation of the monetary two-country
DSGE model with nominal rigidities developed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (2002), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Benigno and Benigno (2006), and others.
The key diﬀerences involve (i) introducing incomplete international capital markets in order to
study international lending and borrowing and (ii) allowing for both tradable and nontradable
goods in order to nest the OR model of the current account and real exchanges rates. We
ﬁnish this section by analyzing the relation between our model and OR’s speciﬁcation. Section
3 presents the log-linear model and characterizes the monetary transmission mechanism in
this kind of environment. Section 4 then discusses our numerical simulations under diﬀerent
scenarios for current account adjustment and explores the implications of diﬀerent monetary
rules. Our baseline case presumes perfect pass-through of exchange rates to import prices.
Section 5 considers the implications of imperfect pass-through. Concluding remarks are in
section 6.
2T h e M o d e l
We begin this section with a brief overview of the model, then present the details of the
production sectors, and close with a description of the equilibrium.
2For related work, see the references in the IMF World Outlook, April 2007.
32.1 Overview
The framework is a variation of OR’s model of current account adjustment and the exchange
rate. Whereas OR studied a simple two-country endowment economy, we add production,
nominal price rigidities, and monetary policy. In addition, while OR performed the static
experiment of examining the response of the exchange rate to closure of the current account
deﬁcit, we examine the dynamic adjustment path. Our interest is to explore the implications
of diﬀerent adjustment scenarios for the appropriate course of monetary policy.
There are two countries: home (H) and foreign (F). Each country has one representative
household that is assumed to behave competitively.3 Within each country, the household
consumes tradable and nontradable consumption goods. Tradable goods, further, consist of
both home- and foreign-produced goods. For simplicity, there are no capital goods.
Each household consists of a continuum of workers of measure unity. Each member of
the household consumes the same amount. Hence, there is perfect risk-sharing within each
country. Each worker works in a particular ﬁrm in the country that produces intermediate
tradable or nontradable goods. Therefore, there is a continuum of intermediate-goods ﬁrms of
measure unity. Because we want to allow for some real rigidity in price setting, we introduce
local labor markets for each intermediate-goods ﬁrm (see, for instance, Woodford, 2003).
A fraction of the workers work in the nontradable-goods sector, while the rest work in the
tradable-goods sector.
There are hence two production sectors within each country: one for nontradable goods
and one for a domestic tradable good. Within each sector, there are ﬁnal and intermediate
goods ﬁrms. Within each sector, competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms produce a single homogenous
good with a CES technology that combines diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. Intermediate
goods ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors and set prices on a staggered basis.
Because we wish to study current account dynamics, we allow for incomplete ﬁnancial
markets at the international level. There is a single bond that is traded internationally and
is denominated in units of home currency.4 Foreign country citizens may also hold a bond
3We could alternatively consider a continuum of measure unity of identical households in each country.
4The denomination of the international asset in U.S. currency is the only source of valuation eﬀects in our
model. If the dollar depreciates, the real value of U.S. foreign liabilities reduces, hence generating a capital
gain. Cavallo and Tille (2006) discuss in details how this mechanism can aﬀect the rebalancing of the U.S.
current account deﬁcit in the context of the OR model. Bems and Dedola (2006) investigate the role of cross-
country equity holdings and ﬁnd that this channel can smooth the current account adjustment by increasing
risk sharing.
4denominated in units of foreign currency, but this bond is not traded internationally.5
While we allow for nominal price rigidities in both the nontradable and tradable sectors,
for simplicity, we assume in our baseline case that across borders there is perfect exchange-
rate pass-through. Hence, the law of one price holds for tradable goods. There is of course
considerable evidence of imperfect pass-through from exchange rates to import prices (see, for
instance, Campa and Goldberg, 2006). Nonetheless, we think there are several reasons why
in our baseline case it may be reasonable to abstract from this consideration. First, evidence
that ﬁrms adjust prices sluggishly to “normal” exchange movements may not be relevant
to situations where there are sudden large exchange-rate movements, as could happen in
a current account reversal. Second, under the baseline calibration, our model is broadly
consistent with the evidence on low pass-through of exchange rates to ﬁnal prices consumer
prices. We obtain low pass-through to consumer prices because the calibrated import share
is low, as is consistent with the evidence.6 Nonetheless, it can be argued that the model
with perfect pass-through misses out on some of the very high frequency dynamics between
exchange rates, import prices and ﬁnal consumer prices. We accordingly extend the baseline
model to allow for imperfect pass-through in section 6.
We next present the details of the model. We characterize the equations for the home
country. Unless stated otherwise, there is a symmetric condition for the foreign country.
2.2 The Household








γ (1 − γ)
. (1)
We employ the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation to maintain analytical tractability. The implied
elasticity of substitution of unity between tradables and nontradables, however, is not unrea-
sonable from a quantitative standpoint and corresponds to the baseline case of OR.7
5Since there is complete risk-sharing within a country, this bond is redundant. We simply add it to derive
an uncovered interest parity condition.
6Campa and Goldberg (2006) estimate an exchange rate pass through elasticty to consumer prices of 0.08,
which is close to the analogous value in our model. In our framework, the low value obtains because imports
in the consumption bundle have small weight relative to non-traded goods and home tradables.
7Model simulations suggest that varying this elasticity from 0.5 to 2.0 (the range considered by OR) does
not have a major eﬀect on the quantitative results.
5Tradable consumption goods, in turn, are the following composite of home tradables CHt















Following OR, we allow for home bias in tradables, that is, α>0.5. We use a CES speciﬁcation
as opposed to Cobb-Douglas, given that the elasticity of substitution among tradables is likely
to be higher than across tradables and nontradables. Further, as we will demonstrate, the
departure from Cobb-Douglas permits the terms of trade to have a direct eﬀect on the trade
balance.
Given that the household minimizes expenditure costs given (1) and (2), the index for
the nominal price of the consumption composite, Pt, is given by the following function of the






Similarly, from cost minimization, we may express PTt as the following function of the price










We assume that the law of one price holds for tradables. Let Et be the the nominal
exchange rate and let the superscript ∗ denote the corresponding variable for the foreign
country. Then, we have:
Pjt = EtP∗
jt
for j = H,F.
The household in each country consists of a continuum of workers who consume and supply
labor. Within the household, a fraction γ of workers work in the tradable goods sector, while
af r a c t i o n1−γ work in the nontradable goods sector. As we noted earlier, within each sector,
labor markets are local, and we assume that each worker works in a particular ﬁrm within
the sector.8 Let f ∈ [0,1] index the intermediate-goods ﬁrms, and let f ∈ [0,γ) denote ﬁrms
in the tradable-goods sector and let f ∈ [γ,1] denote ﬁrms in the nontradable-goods sector.
Then we also let f ∈ [0,1] index workers in the household. Let Lkt(f) denote hours worked by
8To be clear, the household decides labor supply for each individual worker.
6worker f in sector k = H,N (where f ∈ [0,γ) for k = H and f ∈ [γ,1] for k = F). Finally,
let θt be the household’s subjective discount factor. The preferences for the household in





where the period utility ut is given by













The discount factor θt is endogenous and is deﬁned by the recursion






log ¯ Ct − ϑ
¢,
where ¯ Ct is detrended consumption, treated as exogenous by the household and hence corre-
sponding to an average across households in case we replace the representative household by
an explicit continuum of identical households. Following Uzawa (1968), we make the discount
factor endogenous to ensure a determinate steady state in the presence of incomplete markets
and international lending and borrowing.9 In particular, we choose the constant ψ to pin
down the steady-state discount factor to the desired value and we choose the constant ϑ to
ensure ψ>0, which guarantees that the discount factor is decreasing in the level of average
consumption.10 Intuitively, under this formulation, there is a positive spillover from average
consumption to individual consumption. Higher consumption within the community induces
individuals to want to consume more today relative to the future, that is, βt decreases. As
in Uzawa (1968), indebtedness reduces borrowers’ consumption, which raises their discount
factor, thus inducing them to save, and vice-versa. We stress, however, that this formulation
is simply a technical ﬁx. We parametrize the model so that the endogenous discount factor
has only a negligible eﬀect on the medium term dynamics by picking ψ to be suﬃciently
small.
9For a recent survey of diﬀerent approaches to introducing a determinate steady state with incomplete
international ﬁnancial markets, see Bodenstein (2006).
10Nothing would change signiﬁcantly if the discount factor depended on utility (perceived as exogenous)
instead of consumption. We opt for consumption since it leads to a simpler dynamic relation for the discount
factor. The eﬀect on the quantitative performance of the model is negligible.
7Finally, the variable ςt is a preference shock which follows a ﬁrst order autoregressive
process with i.i.d. normal innovations






The preferences for the foreign household are deﬁned similarly.
Let Bt represent the nominal holdings at the beginning of period t+1of an internationally
traded one-period riskless bond nominated in home currency. Let Wkt(f) be the nominal wage
in sector k = H,N that worker f ∈ [0,1] faces. Finally, let Υt be dividends net of lump sum
taxes. Then the household’s budget constraint is given by






WNt(f)LNt(f)df + Υt, (8)
where It−1 denotes the gross nominal domestic-currency interest rate between period t − 1
and t.
The household maximizes the utility function given by equation (5) subject to the budget
c o n s t r a i n tg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 8 ) ,a sw e l la st h e d e ﬁnitions of the various composites, given
by equations (1) and (2). The ﬁrst order necessary conditions of the household’s problem are
all reasonably conventional.









































We assume that the structure of the foreign country is similar, but with two diﬀerences.
First, the realizations of the country-speciﬁc shocks may diﬀer across the countries. Second,
we assume that the foreign country bond is not traded internationally. Thus, while citizens
of H trade only in domestic bonds, citizens of F may hold either domestic or foreign country
bonds
Accordingly, given that foreign country citizens must be indiﬀerent between holding do-





























Note that, since there is only one representative household in country F,t h ef o r e i g nb o n d
will be in zero net supply in equilibrium.
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Final Goods Firms
As mentioned f ∈ [0,γ) and f ∈ [γ,1] denote intermediate-goods ﬁrms in the tradable-
goods and nontradable-goods sector, respectively. Within sector k = {H,N}, competitive



























































Each intermediate goods ﬁrm produces output using only labor input. Let Ykt(f) be the
output of intermediate goods ﬁrm f in sector k.L e tLkt(f) be total input from the ﬁrm’s
local labor market (supplied by worker f)a n dl e tAt be a productivity factor that is common
within the country.11 We assume that production is linear in labor inputs as follows:
Ykt(f)=AtLkt(f). (17)
Let Zt be trend productivity and eat be the cyclical component. Then At obeys





where g is the trend productivity growth rate. We defer a full description of the cyclical
component eat to section 4.1, other than saying that this component is stationary.
Assuming that the ﬁrm acts competitively in the local labor market, cost minimization





Firms set prices on a staggered basis. Each period a fraction ξ of ﬁrms do not adjust their
price. These ﬁrms produce output to meet demand, assuming the price does not fall below




ξsΛt,t+s [Pkt(f) − MCk,t+s(f)]Yk,t+s(f), (20)
11It is straightforward to allow for sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks as well.
10where Λt,t+s = βt+s (Ct+s/Ct)
−1 (Pt/Pt+s) is the stochastic discount factor between t and
t + s.
The ﬁrm maximizes the objective (20), given the demand for its product (15) and its
production function (17). The ﬁrst order condition for the optimal reset price Po







kt − (1 + μ)MCk,t+s(f)]Yk,t+s(f)
)
=0 , (21)
where μ ≡ (σ − 1)
−1.








2.4 Current Account Dynamics and the Real Exchange Rate






+N X t, (23)

















In our benchmark framework we suppose that monetary policy obeys the following simple





where ˜ It is the “full-adjustment” nominal rate, which depends on the steady-state natural
rate of interest in the frictionless zero inﬂation equilibrium, I,a n do nt h eg r o s si n ﬂation rate
Pt/Pt−1






We begin with this kind of rule as a benchmark because it provides the simplest empirical
characterization of monetary policy by the major central banks over the past twenty years
(see, for instance, Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998). We will experiment with other rules,
however, including targeting rules.
2.6 Equilibrium
For both home and foreign tradables, production must equal demand:
YNt = CNt,Y ∗
Nt = C∗
Nt. (29)
The production of home tradables must equal the sum of the demand from domestic and
foreign residents:
YHt = CHt + C∗
Ht, (30)
where C∗
Ht denotes the demand for home tradable by the foreign household.




t represents the nominal holdings of the domestic bond by the foreign household.
Conditions (31) and (23) imply that the foreign trade balance in units of home consumption,
QtNX∗
t, must equal the negative of the home trade balance, −NXt.
12Finally, if all these conditions are satisﬁed, by Walras’ Law, the production of foreign
tradables equals demand.
This completes the description of the model. There are two special cases to note. First, in
the polar case where the probability a price remains ﬁxed is zero (that is, ξ =0 ), the economy
converges to a ﬂexible-price equilibrium. Second, with ξ =0and the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply equal to zero (that is, ϕ = ∞), the model converges to the dynamic version of the
endowment economy in OR.
Because it will eventually prove convenient in characterizing the full log-linear model,
before proceeding further, we deﬁne aggregate domestic real output, PYtYt/Pt as the sum of







where PYt is the nominal domestic producer price index. In general, PYt may diﬀer from Pt
since domestic consumption may diﬀer from domestic output. In steady state, however, the
trade balance is zero, implying PYt = Pt is the long-run equilibrium. Outside steady state,
no-arbitrage requires that PYtequals the output-share weighted sum of the sectoral nominal
prices.
2.7 International Relative Prices and Current Account: A Comparison
with OR
In this section we present some intuition about the workings of our model. To do so, we ﬁrst
describe how our model nests OR’s model of current accounts and exchange rates. We then
outline how our modiﬁcations will inﬂuence the general equilibrium.




Tt be the relative prices of nontradables to tradables in the home and foreign
countries, respectively, and let Tt ≡ PFt/PHt be the terms of trade. After making use of the
relevant price indices and the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate, the real exchange rate may





t +( 1− α)










13Given home bias (α>0.5), the real exchange rate is increasing in Tt. It is also increasing in
X∗
t and decreasing in Xt.
We now turn the link between international relative prices and the current account. Substi-
tuting the demand functions for home tradables into the respective market-clearing condition
yields:





















Given that the international bond market clears, the trade balance in each country may be
expressed as:

















Finally, the current account may be expressed as:
CAt =( It−1 − 1)
Bt−1
Pt
+N X t. (38)
OR pursue the following strategy. They take as given the current account, CAt, net interest
payments, (It−1 −1)Bt−1/Pt, and the sectoral outputs in the home and foreign country, YHt,
YNt, YFt, and YNt. Then, the seven equations (33) through (38) determine net exports, NXt,
tradable consumption in the home and foreign countries, CTt and C∗
Tt, along with the four
relative prices, Tt,X t,X ∗
t and Qt.
OR next consider a set of comparative-static exercises where the current account adjusts
from a deﬁcit to zero. Holding constant international relative prices and all the sectoral
outputs, an improvement in the current account requires a decrease in domestic tradable
consumption and a roughly oﬀsetting increase in foreign tradable consumption. With home
bias, the relative decrease in home tradable consumption causes a deterioration in the terms
of trade, that is, an increase in T . In addition, the drop in home tradable consumption
required to bring the current account into balance reduces the demand for nontradables,
causing a fall in the relative price of nontradables to tradables X. Conversely, the rise of
tradable consumption in the foreign country pushes up the relative price of nontradables,
14X∗. The adjustment in each of the relative prices works to generate a depreciation of the
home country’s real exchange rate. Under their baseline calibration, for example, OR ﬁnd
that closing the current account from its current level would require a depreciation of the
real exchange rate of about thirty percent. Of course, their results depend on the elasticities
of substitution between nontradables and tradables and between home and foreign tradables,
and require that sectoral outputs are ﬁxed.
Our framework builds on OR and endogenizes the movement of the current account and
sectoral outputs in the two countries. The current account is connected to aggregate activity
in part through the impact of aggregate consumption on tradable consumption demand within
each country:
CT = γ (Xt)
1−γ Ct,C ∗




Everything else equal, accordingly, a rise in aggregate consumption within a country raises
the demand for tradable consumption, thus causing a deterioration in the trade balance.
The production of tradables and nontradables will of course also depend on aggregate
economic activity. Within the ﬂexible-price version of the model, labor demand and supply
along the production technology within each sector determine sectoral outputs. Aggregate
consumption and real interest rates within each country depend upon the respective economy-
wide resource constraints and the respective consumption Euler equations. The relative
pattern of real interest rates across countries and the real exchange rate, in turn, depend on
the uncovered interest parity condition.
Within the sticky-price version of the model, for ﬁrms not adjusting price in a given period,
output adjusts to meet demand so long as the markup is non-negative. Given staggered price
setting, the price index within each sector adjusts sluggishly to deviations of the markup from
desired levels. As a consequence, there is stickiness in the movement of the overall index of
domestic prices and also in the relative price of nontradables to tradables. The nominal
stickiness of course implies that monetary policy inﬂuences the joint dynamics of output
and inﬂation. There are potentially several extra complications from this open economy
setup. Monetary policy can inﬂuence not only short term real interest rates but also the real
exchange rate. In addition, both domestic output and inﬂation depend on foreign economic
behavior. Finally, stickiness in the movement of the relative price of nontradables to tradables
may distort the eﬃcient adjustments of the two sectors to international disturbances. In the
numerical exercises that follow we illustrate these various phenomena.
15We now turn to the loglinear model.
3T h e L o g l i n e a r M o d e l
We consider a loglinear approximation of the model around a deterministic steady state. We
ﬁrst characterize the steady state and then turn to the complete loglinear model. Fortunately,
the model is small enough so that the key mechanisms of current account and exchange-rate
determination as well as monetary policy transmission become quite transparent.
3.1 Steady State
The steady state is very simple. In the symmetric long-run equilibrium, each country grows at
the steady-state productivity growth rate g. Both the trade balance and the stock of foreign
debt are zero:
NX = B =0
It is then straightforward to show these restrictions imply that in the symmetric deterministic
steady state, all the relevant relative prices are unity:
T = X = Q =1
In addition, for each country there are a simple set of relations that characterize the
behavior of the real quantities. Given that the trade balance is zero, national output simply
equals national consumption:
Yt = Ct.
Next, since relative prices are unity, expenditures shares depend simply on preference para-
meters:
CHt = αγCt,C Ft =( 1− α)γCt,C Nt =( 1− γ)Ct.
Market clearing for output in each sector requires:
YHt = CHt + C∗
Ht,Y Nt = CNt.
Similarly, market clearing for labor in each sector along with the respective production
16technologies pins down steady-state output with each sector
YHt
Zt





=( 1− γ)(1 + ϕ)
1
1+ϕ




where 1+g is the gross growth rate of technology.
3.2 Loglinear model
We now characterize the loglinear system for the home country. A symmetric set of equations
that we do not list here applies for the foreign country. Lower case variables denote log-
deviations from a deterministic steady-state, except as noted otherwise.12
We begin by expressing domestic real output as a linear combination of home tradable
and non-tradable output:
yt = γyHt +( 1− γ)yNt (40)
The demand for home tradables depends positively on the terms of trade and on both relative
prices of nontradables as well as on aggregate consumption in both countries:
yHt =2 α(1 − α)ητt +( 1− γ)[αxt +( 1− α)x∗
t]+αct +( 1− α)c∗
t. (41)
In turn, the demand for nontradables may be expressed as:
yNt = −γxt + ct, (42)
where xt ≡ pNt−pTt. The demand for home nontradables depends negatively on the relative
price of nontradables and positively on aggregate consumption.
From the loglinear intertemporal Euler equation, consumption depends positively on ex-
pected future consumption, and inversely on the real interest rate and the time varying
discount factor:
ct =E tct+1 − (it − Etπt+1) − ˆ βt, (43)
12The approximation is performed about the steady state in which quantities are constant, that is, expressed
relative to trend productivity Zt.
17where ˆ βt denotes the percent deviation of βt from steady state. The endogenous discount
factor depends negatively on consumption according to
ˆ βt = ςt − ψβct, (44)
where ςt, the exogenous shock to the discount factor, obeys the autoregressive process given
by equation (7). The presence of ct reﬂects the consumption externality on the discount that
ensure determinate model dynamics. As noted earlier, we pick ψ to be tiny to ensure that
this feature has only a negligible eﬀect on medium term dynamics.
One can view equations (40), (41), (42), (43), and (44) as determining aggregate demand
for output conditional on the real interest rate and international relative prices. Given nom-
inal rigidities, of course, the real interest rate will depend on monetary policy. By adjusting
the short term interest rate, the central bank can also inﬂuence the terms of trade, as we
show explicitly below.
Given that there is nominal inertia on both the tradable and nontradable sectors, τt and
xt evolve as follows:
τt = τt−1 +( ∆qt + π∗
Ft− π∗
t) − (πHt − πt), (45)
xt = xt−1 + πNt− πHt − γ(1 − α)∆τt. (46)
Note, however, that because there is perfect pass-through in the tradable sector, there is an
immediate eﬀect of exchange-rate adjustments on the terms of trade.
Let the superscript o denote the ﬂexible-price equilibrium value of a variable. Then inﬂa-
tion in the tradable goods and nontradable goods sectors may be expressed as:





t)] + βEtπH,t+1, (47)
πNt = κ(yNt− yo
Nt)+βEtπN,t+1 (48)
with yo
Ht = at +( 1+ϕ)
−1 nxo
t, yo
Nt = at,a n dκ =( 1− ξ)(1 − βξ)(1+ϕ)/[ξ (1 + σϕ)].
Inﬂation in the nontradable sector depends on the current output gap within the sector
and on anticipated future nontradable inﬂation, in analogy to the standard New Keynesian
Phillips curve (see, for instance, Woodford, 2003). For the tradable goods sector, the “trade
balance gap” matters as well. Roughly speaking, a higher trade deﬁcit relative to the ﬂexible-
price equilibrium value is associated with higher marginal cost in the tradable goods sector
resulting from this imbalance.
18Overall CPI inﬂation depends not only on domestic inﬂation but also on the evolution of
the price of imported goods:
πt = γπHt +( 1− γ)πNt+ γ(1 − α)∆τt. (49)
We next turn to interest rates and exchange rates. In the baseline case, the nominal
interest rate follows a simple feedback rule with interest-rate smoothing:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)φππt. (50)
Uncovered interest rate parity implies the following link between real interest rates and real
exchange rates:
(it − Etπt+1) − (i∗
t − Etπ∗
t+1)=Etqt+1 − qt. (51)
Finally we turn to the trade balance and the evolution of net foreign indebtedness. Net
exports depend inversely on the terms of trade and positively on the current and expected
path of the discount factor shock:
nxt = δ(η − 1)τt +
∞ X
s=0
(1 − α)Etˆ βRt+s, (52)
with δ =2 α(1 − α) > 0 and where τt ≡ pFt − pHt and ˆ βRt is the diﬀerence between the
home and foreign time varying discount factors. Since the steady-state value of net exports
is zero, nxt is net exports as a fraction of steady-state output. Equation (52) is obtained
by combining the resource constraint, the market-clearing condition for home tradables, the
uncovered interest parity condition, along with the consumption Euler equations for the two
countries.13 Note that in the log case (η =1 ) , the trade balance is driven purely by the
exogenous preference shock. In this instance, as emphasized by Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and
others, the terms of trade adjusts to oﬀset any impact on the trade balance of disturbances
(other than shifts in consumption/saving preferences). This result also depends on having a
unit elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables, as we have here.
13From combining equations one obtains
nxt =( 1− α)ˆ βR,t − δ(η − 1)Et∆τt+1 + Etnxt+1
Given that ˆ βR,t is stationary about a zero mean, one can interate this relation forward to obtain equaton (52).




bt−1 +n x t (53)
where bt is debt normalized by trend output.
The system thus far consists of fourteen equations that determine fourteen variables, {it,
ct, ˆ βt,y t,y Ht,y Nt,x t,π t,π Ht,π Nt,q t, nxt,τ t,b t}, conditional on the foreign economy and
conditional on the exogenous shocks, ςt and at and the values of the predetermined variables
bt−1,τ t−1,a n dxt−1. The complete model consists of these equations plus nine more that












two foreign predetermined variables, τ∗
t−1,a n dx∗
t−1. These nine equations are the foreign
counterparts of equations (41), (43), (44), (42), (46), (47), (48), (49), and (50). In addition,
given the evolution of debt determined by the model, we may express the current account as:




where cat is the current account normalized by steady-state growth.
The model is not small, but it is parsimonious (we think) given its objectives. In par-
ticular, it captures the link between international relative prices and the current account
stressed by OR. Given our goal of studying the role of monetary policy, it goes beyond OR
by endogenizing the determination of these variables within a two-country monetary general
equilibrium framework.
The way monetary policy inﬂuences international relative prices and the current account
further is fairly clear. Given that prices are sticky, an increase in the nominal interest rate
causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate (holding constant expectations of the future)
as the uncovered interest parity condition (51) makes clear. The appreciation of the exchange
rate improves the terms of trade (that is, τt falls), as equation (45) suggests. This in turn
leads to a deterioration of the trade balance and hence of the current account. The evolution
of the current account and international relative prices will have implications for the behavior
of output and inﬂation within each country and thus implications for the appropriate course
of monetary policy. It should also be clear that the monetary policy of one country has
implications for the other.
We next employ the model to explore the implications of current account behavior for
monetary policy.
204 Current Account Dynamics and Monetary Policy
We ﬁrst describe how we calibrate the model. We then explore the behavior of the model
economy in our benchmark case, where each country’s central bank sets the short term
interest rate according to a Taylor rule with partial adjustment, as described by equation
(50). We choose this formulation of monetary policy for our benchmark case because the
evidence suggests it provides a reasonable way to describe the behavior of the major central
banks during the past twenty-ﬁve years. We then proceed to consider alternative policy
environments. For each policy environment, we consider two scenarios for current account
adjustment. In the “slow burn” scenario, the adjustment is smooth and drawn out over time.
In the “fast burn” scenario, instead, the current account is subject to a sharp reversal.
4.1 Calibration
We have in mind the U.S. as the home country and the rest of the world as the foreign
country. This is somewhat problematic since the countries in the model are symmetric in
size while the U.S. output is only about a quarter of world GDP. It is not hard to extend the
model to allow for diﬀerences in country size, though at the cost of notational complexity.
Thus, for this paper, we stick with the simpler setup at the cost of some quantitative realism.
The model is quarterly. The three parameters that govern the open-economy dimension of
the model are the preference share parameter for tradables (γ), the preference share parameter
for home tradables (α), and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables
(η). Based on the evidence and arguments in OR, we set γ =0 .25, α =0 .7,a n dη =2 .0.N o t e
that our consumption composite imposes a unit elasticity of substitution between tradables
and nontradables. This number is within the range of plausible values suggested by OR and
is actually the benchmark case in their study.
There are ﬁve additional preference parameters, three of which are standard: the steady-
state discount factor (β), the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (ϕ)a n dt h e
elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs (σ). We set β =0 .99 and ϕ =2 .0.
The latter implies a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.5, which is squarely in the range of
estimates from micro-data. We set σ =1 1to deliver a ten percent steady-state price markup
in both the tradable- and nontradable-goods sectors. The other two preference parameters,
ψ and ϑ, govern the spillover eﬀect of aggregate consumption on the discount factor. We
ﬁx ψ consistently with our choice of β and we adjust ϑ so that ψ is small but positive. In
21particular, we arbitrarily set ϑ = −1000 and obtain ψ =7 .2361 · 10−6. Implicitly, we are
simply ensuring that the endogeneity of the discount factor does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
medium term dynamics.
Next, we set the probability that a price does not adjust (ξ)a t0.66. This implies a mean
duration that a price is ﬁxed of 3 quarters, which is consistent with the micro evidence.
The two parameters of the policy rule are the feedback coeﬃcient φπ and the smoothing
parameter ρ. Based on the evidence in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) and elsewhere, we
set φπ =2 .0 and ρ =0 .75.
Finally, we turn to the parameters that govern the preference shock ςt and the cyclical
productivity shock at. As we discussed earlier, ςt is meant to be a simple way capture struc-
tural factors that inﬂuence diﬀerences in consumption/saving propensities across countries,
such as ﬁscal policy, demographics, and capital market development. In this regard, it is an
object that is likely to persist over time. We thus set the serial correlation parameter that
governs this process (ρς)a t0.97.
We assume that trend productivity grows at a 2% annual rate (corresponding to g =0 .5%).
Since we would like cyclical diﬀerences in productivity growth to contribute to current account
dynamics, we model the cyclical component of technology allowing for persistent forecastable
periods of productivity movement away from trend that may vary over time. In particular,
at is a combination of two processes, ut and vt, as follows:
at = ut − vt (55)
with
ut = ρuut−1 +  t +  ut
vt = ρvvt−1 +  t
where ρu =0 .999 >ρ v, and where  t and  ut are zero mean i.i.d. shocks.
The assumption that ut is “near” unit root allows us to partition the shocks, roughly
speaking, into one ( ut)t h a tp r i m a r i l ya ﬀects the current level of productivity and another ( t)
that aﬀects its expected growth rate. Suppose we start at a steady state with ut−1 = vt−1 =0 .
A positive innovation in  t has no direct eﬀect on at in the ﬁrst period. However, since ρu
>ρ v, at will grow steadily for a period of time. Since ρu is close to unity and greater than ρv,
22this period can be quite long. Thus, innovations in  t can induce growth cycles. By contrast,
as h o c kt o ut has a direct aﬀect on at but only generates a one-period blip in the growth rate
since ρu is near unity. We can allow for  t and  ut to be correlated in any arbitrary fashion.
Similar to OR, we initialize the model to match roughly the current international situation,
that is, a current account deﬁcit for the home country (that is, the U.S.) of approximately 5
percent of GDP (or equivalently 20 percent of tradable output) along with a stock of foreign
debt approximately equal to 20 percent of GDP annualized (equivalent to 80 percent of
tradable output).14 We start with the ﬂexible-price model and set the predetermined value
of foreign indebtedness at its value in the data. We then adjust  t for the home country and ρv
so that domestic productivity growth is expected to be roughly half percent above trend for
the next decade. We adjust  ∗
t exactly in the opposite direction and set ρv = ρ∗
v.W eﬁxt h e
diﬀerential in expected productivity growth between the two countries at one percent based
on the evidence from the G7 ex the U.S. over the past decade. It turns out that this accounts
for roughly one third of the U.S. current account deﬁcit. We then add in a preference shock
for both the home and foreign countries to explain the diﬀerence. Again, this preference
shock is meant to account for factors that lead to diﬀerent consumption/saving propensities
across countries.
We then turn to the sticky-price model. We initialize the predetermined variables in
t h es t i c k y - p r i c em o d e l ,τt−1 and xt−1, to match the values that arose in the ﬁrst period of
the ﬂexible-price model. We then feed in the same size shocks as before to see whether we
matched the current account evidence. If not, we adjust proportionately the sizes of all the
shocks. We found that in all cases, only very tiny adjustments were necessary.
4.2 Baseline Case
We now analyze our baseline case where monetary policy in each country is given by a Taylor
rule with partial adjustment, as described by equation (50). We characterize the response of
the home country economy in both the slow and fast burn scenarios. For the most part, we do
not show the foreign country variables because to a ﬁrst approximation their movement is of
equal magnitude and the opposite sign to those of the home country variables. This mirrored
response arises because: (i) the countries are of equal size; (ii) the shocks we feed in are of
similar magnitude and opposite signs; and (iii) for our baseline case, the two countries follow
14The recent current account deﬁcit is more on the order of 6 percent of GDP, but we stick with the 5
percent number to maintain comparability with OR.
23the same policy rule. It is true that one country is a debtor and the other a creditor. While
this introduces a small diﬀerence in the low-frequency behavior of aggregate consumption
across countries, it doesn’t introduce any major diﬀerences in the comparative dynamics.
4.2.1 The Slow Burn Scenario
We start with the slow burn scenario. The top panel of ﬁgure 2 plots the response of a
variety of “international” variables for this case, while the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2 plots
mostly “domestic” variables. In each plot, the solid line presents the response of the model
with nominal price rigidities. To provide a benchmark, the dotted line presents the response
of the ﬂexible-price model. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters from the initial
period while, for the quantity variables and relative prices, the vertical axis measures the
percent deviation from steady state. Inﬂation and interest rates are measured in annualized
basis points.
To organize the discussion, it is useful to ﬁrst describe the ﬂexible-price case. As we noted
earlier, we initialize the model with a current account deﬁcit of 20 percent of tradable output.
As the top panel of ﬁgure 2 shows, in the slow burn scenario the half life for adjustment of
the current account is about seven years.15 In the absence of any further shocks, after ten
years the current account has closed by about sixty percent. The protracted current account
deﬁcit produces a sustained increase in net foreign indebtedness that does not level oﬀ until
far in the future. Associated with the large current account deﬁcit is a consumption boom in
the home country (along with a consumption bust in the foreign country). Consumption is
more than three and a half percent above steady state in the home country, with the reverse
b e i n gt r u ei nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y . T h es u s t a i n e du p w a r dm o v e m e n ti nc o n s u m p t i o ni nt h e
home country is due to the fact that for a sustained period productivity growth in the home
country is above trend. Note in ﬁgure 2 that the upward movement in domestic output in
percentage terms is nearly three time that of home country consumption. This diﬀerential
helps account for why the current account is closing steadily over this period, despite the
growth in consumption.
As ﬁgure 2 also shows, the current account imbalance implies an expected depreciation of
almost 30 percent, in line with the estimates of OR. Under the slow burn scenario, the half
life of this adjustment is roughly ﬁve years. The total expected exchange-rate depreciation is
accounted for by a 15 percent depreciation of the terms of trade and an expected decline in
15Interestingly, this prediction is very close to that of the GEM model. See Faruqee et al. (forthcoming).
24the relative price of nontradables to tradables of 14 percent, along with a symmetric increase
in the foreign relative price of nontradables to tradables.16 This decomposition is also in
line with OR. Again, this correspondence is not that surprising since we are using a similar
calibration of the international sector. Where we diﬀer from OR is by providing a model of
the dynamic adjustment path.
One other result worth noting for this case involves the real interest-rate diﬀerential be-
tween the home and foreign country. As the bottom panel in ﬁgure 2 shows, in the initial
period, the real interest rate for the ﬂexible-price model is roughly two hundred basis points
above steady state. It then steadily converges back to steady state. The foreign country
interest rate is the mirror image, implying an initial real interest-rate diﬀerential of roughly
four hundred basic that erodes steadily over time. The source of these interest-rate dynamics
is the expected movement in the real exchange rate. Given that uncovered interest parity
holds (at least in the model!), the home real interest must be suﬃciently greater than the for-
eign real rate to compensate for the expected real depreciation of the home country currency.
Of course, there is considerable evidence against uncovered interest parity. At the same time,
the associated expected decline in the home country’s short term real interest rate suggests
an inverted yield curve for the home country, everything else equal. Conversely, the expected
rise in the foreign country suggests an upward sloping yield curve for this region. While
certainly a host of other factors are at work, it is possible that these considerations may
help account for the recent yield curve inversion in the U.S., a phenomenon that has been
largely speciﬁc to this country. In any event, as we discuss, that current account adjustment
inﬂuences the path of the natural rate of interest has potentially important implications for
monetary policy.
We now turn to the sticky-price case. The ﬁrst point we emphasize is that the behavior
of the international variables does not diﬀer dramatically from the ﬂexible-price model. Put
diﬀerently, in this baseline case, current account and real exchange-rate behavior appear
to depend mainly on real as opposed to monetary factors. Though there are some small
diﬀerences, current account and real exchange-rate dynamics are very similar across the
sticky- and ﬂexible-price models.
16Given the calibrated elasticities of substitution, the relative price of non-tradables explains about two-
thirds of the overall movement of the real exchange rate. This is partly inconsistent with the last dollar
depreciation episode (late 1980s) when the adjustment occurred mostly through the terms of trade. Relative to
twenty years ago, however, the nontradable sector today represents a much larger share of the economy (Buera
and Kaboski, 2007). Therefore, it is not unlikely that the importance of the relative price of nontradables may
increase signiﬁcantly.
25Under our baseline Taylor rule however, demand in the home country is high relative to
the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. In particular, both consumption and the current account are
above their respective ﬂexible-price equilibrium values (where the latter is driven primarily by
the trade balance). Contributing to the positive current account gap is a systematic positive
diﬀerence between the terms of trade and its ﬂexible-price equilibrium value. In this respect,
the terms-of-trade gap is another indicator that monetary policy is not suﬃciently tight to
curb excess demand in the baseline case. As ﬁgure 2 illustrates, the result is persistent
inﬂation that averages almost a percent and a half (above target) over the ﬁrst ﬁve years.
There is also persistent inﬂa t i o ni nb o t hs e c t o r s ,t h o u g hi ti sn e a r l yd o u b l ei nt h et r a d a b l e
goods sector, due to the relative eﬀect on demand in this sector stemming from the terms of
trade gap. Finally, note the consumer-price inﬂation is roughly thirty to forty basis points
above domestic inﬂation, due to the added eﬀect of the depreciation on import prices.
Note that persistent inﬂation emerges even though the central bank is aggressively ad-
justing interest rates in response to inﬂa t i o n( t h eT a y l o rr u l ec o e ﬃcient is 2.0). A key reason
that a conventional Taylor rule does not perform well in this environment is that it does not
directly respond to the movement in the short term natural rate of interest induced by the
current account imbalance. At zero inﬂation, the rule ﬁxes the nominal rate at its steady-
state value. However, the current imbalance pushes up the short term real rate, implying
a monetary policy that is too expansionary in this instance. It is straightforward to show
that allowing the target interest rate to also depend on an intercept equal to the natural rate
of interest greatly improves the central bank’s ability to contain inﬂation. The problem of
course is that the natural rate is not directly observable. Later we present a rule based on
observables that accomplishes much the same as a natural-rate-of-interest augmented rule.
In the meantime, we simply emphasize the general point that the current account imbalance
may have implications for the natural rate of interest that have to be factored into central
bank policy, one way or another.
4.2.2 The Fast Burn Scenario
We now turn to the fast burn scenario. As we noted in the introduction, the probability does
not seem high that the U.S. would suﬀer the kind of sudden current account reversal that
many emerging market economies have experienced over the last twenty years. Given its well
developed ﬁnancial markets, it does not seem likely that the U.S. would face rapid capital
outﬂows and sharp increases in country risk spreads, as has been endured by a number of
26East Asian or South American countries. In this regard, if we are to imagine such a crisis
arising, we think the most likely scenario is one where there is a sudden reversal of fortune
in the growth prospects of the U.S. relative to the rest of the world.
In particular, we suppose that expected productivity growth in the home country over
the next decade declines by an average of 0.75 percent and that the opposite happens in the
foreign country. Thus the initial 1.0 percent advantage in medium term productivity growth
drops to a 0.5 disadvantage. Think of the productivity boom coming to a sudden end in
the U.S. and at the same time picking up steam quickly abroad.17 Since this is unlikely to
happen instantly, we let the process play out over the course of the year. The shocks that
reduce productivity growth in the home country and raise it in the foreign one are spaced
out evenly over the course of four quarters.
Figure 3 portrays this scenario, both for the sticky- and ﬂexible-price models. The hard
landing begins in quarter 8 and plays out through quarter 12. For both models, the revision
in expectations of relative productivity growth results in a current account reversal of roughly
seventy percent in the year of the “crisis”. The trade balance nearly closes, implying that
most of the remaining current account deﬁcit is due to interest payments. The real exchange
rate drops nearly twenty percent in the ﬂexible-price model. It drops by only three quarters of
this amount, or ﬁfteen percent, in the sticky-price model. The somewhat smaller drop in the
sticky-price model is due to the inertia in the movement of the relative price of nontradables
to tradables in each country that is induced by the staggered nominal price setting within
each sector. At the same time, there is a larger depreciation in the terms of trade in the sticky-
price model relative to the ﬂex price case, owing to a depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate that outpaces the depreciation of the real exchange rate. This relative behavior of the
terms of trade accounts for why at the end of the sharp reversal in expectations, the current
account deﬁcit is smaller by a modest margin in the sticky-price case.
How does the fast burn impact the domestic variables? In the ﬂexible-price model domestic
output actually continues to increase for a period. This somewhat perverse behavior arises
because expectations of lower productivity growth reduce current domestic consumption,
which in turn induces a positive wealth eﬀect on labor supply. Thus, as emphasized in
the recent literature on “news driven” business cycles, within a ﬂexible-price model with
standard preferences and technologies, shifts in expected productivity growth tend to move
17For simplicity, we assume that the shift in relative productivity growth is the product of shifts within
each country that are of equal absolute value but oppositie sign. We would obtain virtually the same results
if most or all of the shift in productivity growth occurs in one country.
27current output in the opposite direction.18 Within our open economy framework, though,
there is also a signiﬁcant compositional eﬀect, owing to the sharp depreciation of the real
exchange rate. As a consequence, the modest rise in total output is accounted for by a sharp
increase in tradable goods output. In contrast, nontradable output begins a steady decline
at the onset of the revision in growth expectations.
In the sticky-price model, the fast burn produces a drop in output, albeit a modest one,
roughly one half percent over the year. Accompanying the output decline is a rise in inﬂation
of roughly 50 b a s i sp o i n t st h a ts t e m sf r o mt h ee xchange-rate depreciation.
The small drop in aggregate output, however, masks a signiﬁcant compositional eﬀect.
There is a major contraction in nontradable output, which drops more than 2.5 percent over
the year. This sharp contraction opens up a gap with the potential level of nontradable output
of more than 2.0 percent at the trough. What accounts for the modest decline in aggregate
output is a sharp increase in tradable goods output, which jumps roughly 7.5 percent, nearly
3.0 percentage points larger than the rise in its potential value. The overreaction in the sec-
toral adjustment, of course, is a product of the stickiness in the relative price of nontradables
and tradables. Thus, the modest decline in overall output relative to its potential level, hides
the eﬃciency losses stemming from the extra-large sectoral adjustments.
There are of course a number of reasons why our baseline model likely understates the
impact of the fast burn on aggregate output. Chief among these is that the model permits
adjustment of the exchange rate to have an instantaneous eﬀect on the demand and pro-
duction of tradables. Adding factors which either slow down this adjustment or introduce a
stronger complementary with nontradable output will mute the ability of the tradable goods
sector to soften the eﬀect of the current account reversal on output. Indeed, in section 6 we
illustrate how under certain monetary policy rules imperfect exchange-rate pass-through can
inhibit any stabilizing adjustment of the tradeable goods sector.
Another consideration is that we abstract from any movement in risk premia. As we
noted, owing to a more advanced ﬁnancial structure, we would not expect a country risk
premium for the U.S. to emerge that could come anywhere near to the levels reached in
emerging market crises. Nonetheless, it is possible that some kind of premium could emerge
that could have the eﬀect of enhancing the crises. Modeling the movement of this premium
in a satisfactory way, however, is beyond the scope of the paper. Though we do not report
18See Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2007) for recent analyses of news driven
business cycles within a ﬂexible price neoclassical framework.
28the results here, we experimented allowing the U.S. country risk premium to rise exogenously
at the onset of a sudden stop. For increases in spread up to 200 basis points, the results we
obtain are qualitatively very similar to our baseline case. The rise in the risk premium, of
course, ampliﬁes a bit the responses of all variables.
Finally, we note that the monetary policy rule is a key factor. The evidence suggests
that countries which have experienced signiﬁcant output drops typically have tied monetary
policy to an exchange-rate peg.19 As a consequence, during the initial phase of the current
account reversal, the central banks of these countries have usually raised short term rates
sharply in order to defend the peg. Large contractions in output have followed these large
increases in short term rates. By contrast, the baseline Taylor rule in our model economy
induces only a tiny rise in current short term rates, followed by a reasonably sharp decline
in future short term rates. This anticipated decline in short rates helps moderate the drop
in aggregate output at the expense of a relatively modest increase in inﬂation. To illustrate
the signiﬁcance of the monetary policy rule on the overall output drop, below we provide two
examples of monetary policy regimes which indeed produced a major contraction in aggregate
economic activity.
4.3 Alternatives to the Baseline Case
We now explore the implications of some alternative monetary policy regimes. We ﬁrst
consider domestic producer inﬂation targeting as an example of a policy that works reasonably
well in our framework. We next consider two policies that do not work well, at least in a fast
burn scenario: consumer-price inﬂation targeting and exchange-rate targeting. As we show,
under either of these policies, the fast burn produces a signiﬁcant drop in aggregate output.
Finally, we consider a case where monetary policy is asymmetric across the two countries:
the home central bank follows a Taylor rule while the foreign central bank (for instance, the
Bank of China) follows a strict peg.
4.3.1 Domestic Producer Inﬂation Targeting
We ﬁrst consider a scenario where the central bank targets domestic producer inﬂation.20 We
do so for two reasons. First, as we noted in the previous section, the simple Taylor rule may
19See, for example, Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007) and Curdia (2007).
20See Svensson (1999) for a discussion of inﬂlation targeting as a monetary policy rule and Svensson and
Woodford (2005) for a more detailed discussion of targeting rules and instrument rules.
29not adequately account for shifts in the potential rate of interest generated by the current
account imbalance. In contrast, the targeting rule requires that the central bank adjust its
instrument to compensate for any impact that shifts in the natural interest rate may have
on inﬂation. Second, as received wisdom suggests, it is desirable to stabilize prices in the
sectors where prices are stickiest (see, for instance, Aoki, 2001, and Benigno, 2004). Eﬃciency
losses from relative price dispersion induced by inﬂation are greatest in these sectors.21 In
addition, by letting prices ﬂoat in ﬂexible-price sectors, the central bank avoids costly output
adjustments in the sticky-price sectors that may be required to stabilize an overall price index.
For each country within our framework, domestic home tradable and nontradables constitute
the sticky-price sectors. By contrast, due to perfect exchange-rate pass-through, import prices
are perfectly ﬂexible. What this suggests is that within our framework, a domestic inﬂation
target may be preferable to a consumer-price inﬂation target. In this section and the next,
we verify this conjecture.
We thus replace the simple Taylor rule for each country with the targeting rule for domestic
producer inﬂation, πDt given by
πDt = γπHt +( 1− γ)πNt =0 (56)
The top panel of ﬁgure 4 reports the response of the model economy to a slow burn
adjustment under this monetary rule. As we would expect, the rule is more eﬀective than
t h es i m p l eT a y l o rr u l ei no ﬀsetting the inﬂationary impact of the current account deﬁcit. In
contrast to the previous case, there is only a very modest increase consumer-price inﬂation.
The targeting rule ﬁxes domestic producer inﬂation (which we do not report) at zero. This
essentially coincides with ﬁxing the larger component of consumer-price inﬂation, given that
the steady-state import share of consumer expenditures is only 7.5 percent under our baseline
calibration. Thus, the only eﬀective source of overall consumer-price inﬂation is the terms of
trade depreciation that boosts import prices. However, since the import share is small, the
impact on overall consumer inﬂation is small, though tangible. The current account imbalance
adds an average 20 b a s i sp o i n t st oi n ﬂation over the ﬁrst ﬁve years. Again, the aggregate
21It is possible to derive an explicit utility-based loss function to measure the welfare implications of diﬀerent
monetary policy rules by using the methods in Woodford (2003). In our case, the result is quite complicated
due to the existence of two sectors in each country. We thus do not report it here. However, such an approach
reveals that in this kind of framework it is producer inﬂaton that is costly as opposed to consumer inﬂation,
due to the costs of the associated relative price dispersion on producton eﬃciency. Strictly speaking though,
welfare losses depend on distortions at the sectoral level. Eﬃciency costs depend on squared deviations of
output from it natural level in each sector as well as on squared deviations of inﬂation in each sector from
zero. There is also a term that reﬂects the loss from incomplete international ﬁnancial markets.
30statistics hide sectoral imbalances. The excess demand for tradable goods pushes up inﬂation
in this sector by an average of 50 basis points. This eﬀect is oﬀset by a modest deﬂation in
the nontradables goods sector.
In the fast burn scenario, the targeting rule eliminates the drop in aggregate output,
as the bottom left panel of ﬁgure 4 shows. Under this rule, the nominal interest drops
immediately through the course of the current account reversal, which works to oﬀset any
decline in aggregate demand. At the same time, though, the sharp depreciation induces a
rise in consumer-price inﬂation of roughly one percentage point over the course of the year.
While the rule moderates the aggregate impact of the fast burn, there remains a signiﬁcant
distortion of the sectoral reallocation. Though it is slightly more moderate than in the baseline
case, nontradable goods output contracts roughly two percentage points over the course of
the current account reversal. There is similarly a signiﬁcant movement in tradable output
above its potential level, which, if anything, is somewhat larger than in the baseline case.
Of course, some qualiﬁcations are in order. As in the baseline case, tradable goods output
responds immediately and the crisis has no eﬀect on the home country risk premium. As
before, both these factors likely moderate the impact of the fast burn. It is also relevant
that frictions introducing persistence in inﬂation such as wage rigidity or backward looking
price indexing are absent. Adding these frictions would likely make a rule that permitted
inﬂation to deviate from target in response to movements in capacity utilization preferable to
the strict inﬂation targeting rule that we have explored. At the same time, it is still likely to
b et h ec a s et h a tf o c u s i n go ns o m em e a s u r eo fd o m e s t i ci n ﬂation is preferable to incorporating
overall consumer-price inﬂation in the targeting rule. We elaborate on this point in the next
section.
In the context of our model, we note that domestic producer inﬂation targeting corresponds
to GDP deﬂator targeting. In making the leap to the real world, the issue may be more
complex, since capital goods prices, which are absent in our model, enter the measure of the
latter. To the extent that capital goods prices are roughly as sticky as those of consumer
goods and services, it may suﬃce to use the GDP deﬂator as the appropriate index of producer
prices to target. An alternative might be to develop a consumer price index that measures
the prices of domestic goods exclusively. While in principle it is possible to construct such
an index, doing so might involve considerable measurement error, especially given the need
to account for complex input/output relationships.
314.3.2 Two Rules to Avoid in a Fast Burn: CPI and Exchange-Rate Targeting
As we noted earlier, the eﬀects on aggregate output of a fast burn depend critically on the
monetary policy rule that is in act. We now give two examples of monetary policy regimes
where the fast burn indeed generates a signiﬁcant output contraction. In the ﬁrst regime, the
central bank targets overall consumer inﬂation as opposed to a measure of domestic inﬂation.
In the second, it follows a Taylor rule that responds to exchange-rate movements as well as
inﬂation.
We begin with CPI targeting. We now suppose that a rule that ﬁxes consumer-price
inﬂation at zero replaces our baseline Taylor rule. In particular, the “strict” CPI targeting
rule is given by
πt = γπHt +( 1− γ)πNt+ γ(1 − α)∆τt =0 , (57)
It should be clear that stabilizing consumer-price inﬂation in the presence of a terms of trade
depreciation requires generating a deﬂation of domestic producer prices. Given that these
prices are sticky, this deﬂation can occur only via an output contraction in at least one of the
sectors. Indeed, this is exactly what happens in the fast burn scenario under this monetary
policy regime.
As the top panel of ﬁgure 5 shows, under CPI targeting, the hard landing induces an
output contraction on the order of 3 percent at the trough. In contrast to the case of domestic
producer inﬂation targeting, the central bank immediately raises the short term interest rate
over 300 basis points, which enhances the contraction. In addition, the sectoral distortions
intensify, many due to a nearly 4.5 percent contraction in nontradable goods output.
It thus appears that targeting a measure of domestic inﬂation is superior to targeting
overall CPI inﬂation, though, as we noted earlier, coming up with a measure of the former
that is appropriately distinct from the latter may not be a trivial undertaking.
We next turn to exchange-rate targeting. As we noted, the emerging market economies
that suﬀered large output contractions during current reversals typically had central banks
that were following an exchange-rate peg. For the Federal Reserve, of course, exchange-rate
considerations have played virtually no role in interest-rate setting, at least in recent times.
It is hard to say, however, whether or not during the kind of current account reversal we have
been considering, pressures might mount for the central bank to respond even modestly to
the depreciation.
32In this spirit, we consider a variation of our baseline rule that permits the central bank
to also respond to the exchange-rate depreciation. Suppose the modiﬁed interest rate rule is
given by
it =¯ ıt + χ∆et (58)
with
¯ ıt = ρ¯ ıt−1 +( 1− ρ)φππt.
Here ¯ ıt is the rate the central bank would choose if it were to follow the baseline Taylor rule.
The actual rate it sets is augmented by a factor that reﬂects the policy adjustment to the
depreciation. We set χ =0 .1, which suggests that a 10 percent exchange-rate depreciation
over the quarter would have the central bank increase the nominal interest rate by 100 basis
points. Relative to a strict peg, the response of the policy rate to exchange-rate movements
is relatively modest.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 5 portrays the hard landing scenario for this case. The drop in
aggregate output is nearly 3.0 percent, as in the case of pure CPI targeting. Again, the reason
for the contraction is that the policy rule forces a rise in short term interest rates throughout
the course of the current account reversal. Similarly, the nontradable goods sector is hit
particularly hard. Output in this sector contracts nearly 5.0 percent.
Overall, policy regimes that produce large interest rate increases in response to the rever-
sal can generate large output contractions. Even in the absences of large aggregate eﬀects,
though, there can be signiﬁcant sectoral misallocations, with large positive output gaps open-
ing up in the nontradable goods sectors and large negative ones in the tradable goods sectors.
4.3.3 A Foreign Exchange-rate Peg
We now return to our baseline case but assume that the foreign central bank abandons the
Taylor rule and instead pegs its currency to that of the home country. We do this for two
reasons. The ﬁrst is to explore the implications of foreign monetary policy on current account
adjustment. In our baseline case, the Taylor rule had the foreign central bank adjust interest
rates in the opposite direction of the home central bank. During the fast burn experiment, the
foreign interest rate behaved as the mirror image of the home country rate: it declined initially
by a modest amount and then began a steady upward trajectory, enhancing the overall terms
of trade depreciation for the home country. To what degree was this “cooperative” foreign
monetary policy helpful in mitigating the impact of the fast burn on home country output?
33One way to get at the issue is to consider the case where the foreign central bank does
not cooperate at all with exchange-rate adjustment and simply follows a peg to the home
country currency. A second consideration involves the impact of a foreign peg on current
account dynamics. It has been widely speculated that by pegging its exchange rate to the
dollar, China has been contributing to the U.S. current account deﬁcits. While the other
country in our model is meant to capture the rest of the world and not simply China, we
can nonetheless shed some light on the issue by adopting the extreme assumption that the
foreign country central bank adopts a peg.22
We accordingly return to the baseline case and, for foreign monetary policy, substitute a
nominal exchange-rate peg for the Taylor rule. From the uncovered interest parity condition, a
pure nominal exchange-rate peg simply requires that the foreign central bank sets its nominal
rate equal to the home country rate:
i∗
t = it. (59)
The top panel of ﬁgure 6 illustrates the response of a small set of domestic, foreign and
international variables for the case of the slow burn. Again, the dotted line reﬂects the
ﬂexible-price equilibrium. As a comparison of ﬁgures 2 and 6 suggests, the foreign-country
peg has virtually no impact on current account or real exchange-rate dynamics. How can this
be if the foreign country is ﬁxing the nominal exchange rate? What causes the real exchange
rate to adjust is a rapid increase in the foreign price level relative to the domestic level.
By not letting its nominal exchange rate appreciate, the foreign country encourages excess
demand in its tradable sector which spills over to its nontradable sector. The end product is
rapid domestic inﬂation, which provides the source of the exchange-rate depreciation and the
current account adjustment. In addition to the current account and the real exchange rate,
the home country economy is also not aﬀected much by the foreign-country peg. Indeed, it
is the foreign country economy that largely bears the brunt.
In a broad sense, the Chinese economy has behaved consistently with the model predic-
tions. As ﬁgure 7 shows, output growth has climbed steadily since 2002, rising from 7 percent
to almost 12 percent in 2007. Moreover, there also has been a recent increase in CPI inﬂation
from 1 to 6 percent in the last two years. Of course, there are a variety of factors such as
price and capital controls that one would need to take into account before applying the model
literally to China. In addition since China only accounts for roughly one quarter of the U.S.
22Besides China, a number of oil producing countries, which, in recent years, have also substantially con-
tributed to ﬁnance the U.S. current account deﬁcit, peg their currency to the dollar too.
34current account deﬁcit, we would need to appropriately adjust the calibration, which would
likely work to dampen the predicted boom. Thus, the point to take away is that at least
in our baseline slow burn scenario, the eﬀect of a foreign peg is felt mainly by the foreign
economy. There is little impact on the current account, the real exchange rate, or the home
country economy.
Finally, the bottom panel of ﬁgure 6 portrays the fast burn scenario. Here there is a more
signiﬁcant impact of the foreign country peg. Intuitively, the sluggishness in nominal price
adjustment becomes more signiﬁcant when disturbances are sudden and large. During the
crisis (quarters 8 to 12), the real exchange rate depreciates only by one fourth as much as it
did in the baseline case. Most of the adjustment occurs over the subsequent two years. The
delayed response of the real exchange (and the terms of trade) leads to the current account
closing only about seventy percent of the amount it did in the baseline case. The inertia
in the real exchange rate leads to a larger drop in aggregate domestic output than in the
baseline case: a drop of 1.0 percent instead of 0.5 percent. At the same time, the main eﬀect
is felt by the foreign country through an enormous boom in output.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that our example is extreme in that we are assuming
that the rest of the world is following a peg. We also abstract from some of the key frictions
that may be relevant to an emerging market economy like China. Nonetheless, at least in
our canonical framework, the main eﬀects of the foreign peg are felt by the foreign economy,
whether in the slow or fast burn scenarios.
5 Imperfect Exchange-Rate Pass-Through
Our baseline model assumes perfect pass-through of exchange-rate movements to import
prices, but is calibrated to match the evidence on pass-through to the CPI. Much of this
evidence, however, is based on an annual frequency, while our model is quarterly. In this
respect, the baseline model may miss the quarterly link between exchange-rate movements,
import prices and the CPI. For the slow burn scenario, this may not be problem, since the
exchange-rate depreciation plays out smoothly or a long period of time. However, it could
be relevant to a situation where there is an abrupt large movement in the exchange rate, as
for example would be likely to arise under a sudden stop.
To get a feel for how import prices respond to sharp exchange-rate depreciations, we
examine data from three countries, Italy, Sweden and the U.K., in the wake of the EMS crisis
35of 1992. Table 1 reports the degree of pass-through on import prices from three to eight
quarters after the initial depreciation for the three countries in our sample. We conclude
from the table that pass-through in response to a large depreciation is high, but delayed.23
Table 1: Imperfect Pass-Through on Import Prices - 1992 ERM Crises.
3 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters 8 Quarters
Italy 49% 81% 66% 69%
Sweden 66% 53% 68% 72%
U.K. 55% 78% 84% 72%
In the model, we add imperfect pass-through following Monacelli (2005). We introduce
monopolistically competitive retailers who import foreign tradables and sell them to domestic
residents. The law of one price holds at the dock but not at the consumer level because local
retailers set the price of imported goods in domestic currency on a staggered basis. Each
period a fraction ˜ ξ of retailers hold their price constant while the remaining fraction 1 − ˜ ξ
solve an optimal dynamic pricing problem. In particular, those importers who change their



























where ˜ μ ≡ (η − 1)
−1. The law of large numbers implies that the price index for imported
23To the extent that importers face any distribution and/or transportation costs, we should expect any long
run exchange rate pass-through to be less than one hundred percent. We abstract from distribution costs
directly. However, we indirectly take account of how distribution costs may aﬀect the link between exchange
rates and ﬁnal goods prices by adjusting the size of the non-traded goods sector.
36goods becomes
PFt = ˜ ξPF,t−1 +( 1− ˜ ξ)Po
Ft. (62)
Given the departure from the law of one price at the consumer level, it is useful to deﬁne
the price gap as the ratio between the foreign price in domestic currency and the domestic






With perfect pass-through, ΨFt equals unity.
Next we note that with imperfect pass-through, the terms of trade diﬀers across coun-
tries. We keep the deﬁnition of the terms of trade from the perspective of the home country
consistent with our baseline speciﬁcation: THt = PFt/PHt. Conversely, we deﬁne the foreign
country terms of trade as TFt ≡ P∗
Ht/P∗
Ft.
In the loglinear model, the market demand for home tradables now accounts for the
diﬀerence in the two countries’ terms of trade
yHt = α(1 − α)η(τHt − τFt)+( 1− γ)[αxt +( 1− α)x∗
t]+αct +( 1− α)c∗
t. (64)
The real exchange rate similarly accounts for the diﬀerences in country-speciﬁc terms of trade:
qt = ψF,t + ατH,t +( 1− α)τF,t +( 1− γ)(x∗
t − xt) (65)
Next, with imperfect pass-through, imported goods inﬂation is characterized by the fol-
lowing Phillips curve relation:
πFt =˜ κψFt+ βEtπF,t+1, (66)
where ψFt is the log-linear deviation of the law of one price gap in (63) from its steady state
value (equal to one) and ˜ κ ≡ (1 − ˜ ξ)(1 − β˜ ξ)/˜ ξ.24 The evolution of the law of one price gap
depends on the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate as well as on the inﬂation rate
diﬀerentials in the two countries
∆ψFt = ∆et + π∗
F,t − πF,t. (67)
24For the same amount of nominal rigidities, the absence of labor inputs (and hence of real rigidities) in the
distribution sector implies that the slope of the imported goods Phillips curve is higher than for domestically
produced goods.
37As before the percent change in the terms of trade depends on import inﬂation minus the
inﬂation of domestic tradables. The diﬀerence in this case is that the relation for import
inﬂation, equation (66), is based on imperfect exchange-rate pass-through. There are an
analogous set of relations that determine the evolution of the terms of trade for the foreign
country. Keeping in mind the new country-speciﬁcd e ﬁnitions of the terms of trade, the
remaining equations of the model are unchanged.
There is only one new parameter that we need to calibrate, the degree of price stickiness
for importers, 1 − ˜ ξ. We set this parameter at 0.66, the same value we used for domestic
producers.
Figure 8 presents a comparison of imperfect versus perfect pass-through for the baseline
case where each central bank obeys a simple Taylor rule. In each instance, the solid line
reﬂects imperfect pass-through, while the dotted line reﬂects perfect pass-through. The top
set of panels reﬂects the slow burn scenario. As we conjectured, the behavior of both the
domestic and international variables is very similar across the two cases. As one might expect,
inﬂation is a bit lower under imperfect pass-through since the impact of the exchange rate on
the domestic price of imports is muted in this case. Though we do not report the results here,
for the slow burn scenario imperfect pass-through does not have much eﬀect on the behavior
of any of the economic variables under the full set of policy experiments we considered for
the benchmark model.
Imperfect pass-through is more relevant under the fast burn scenario. The bottom set of
panels in ﬁgure 8 presents this case. Note ﬁrst that current account is much slower to adjust
under imperfect pass-through. In this instance the depreciation of the home currency has a
much smaller eﬀect on domestic exports. As a further consequence, there is a much sharper
contraction in output relative to the case of perfect pass-through. In this latter case, the
depreciation produces an export boom that softens the overall contraction in output. With
imperfect pass-through, however, the export response is muted, which enhances the overall
contraction in output.
As a check on our formulation of imperfect pass-through, we examine how the model
captures the dynamics of exchange rates and import prices as compared to the experience
of the ERM crisis. The ﬁrst three panels in ﬁgure 9 report the movement of the nominal
exchange rate (the solid line) and import prices (the dotted line) for this period in the data.
The vertical line shows the beginning of the crisis for each country. Both variables are
normalized at zero at the start of the crisis. By construction, the exchange-rate depreciations
38all begin in the ﬁrst quarter following the start of the crisis. In each case, there is a delay of
another quarter before import prices begins to move signiﬁcantly. Though it varies a bit in
each case, on average after a year or so, import prices increase by more than two thirds of
the exchange-rate movement. The fourth panel displays the behavior of the correspondent
variables in the model, given the appropriate normalization. Overall, the model is roughly
consistent with the data.
Finally, as under perfect pass-through, domestic inﬂation targeting is reasonably eﬀective
in insulating the economy from the harmful eﬀects of a sudden stop. As the solid-line in the
bottom left panel of ﬁgure 10 shows, under domestic inﬂation targeting there is no output
drop under the sudden-stop and only a mild increase in inﬂation. One diﬀerence from the
case of perfect pass-through, however, is that CPI targeting is not as harmful. As the dotted
line in the panel shows, there is a larger output drop under CPI targeting relative to domestic
inﬂation targeting, but the diﬀerence is not nearly as dramatic as under perfect pass-through.
With imperfect pass-through the depreciation has less impact on CPI inﬂation, permitting a
less aggressive increase in interest rates to maintain the inﬂation target.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a simple two-country monetary DSGE model that is useful for analyzing
the interplay between monetary policy and current account adjustment. We proceeded to use
the framework to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policy regimes under two diﬀerent
adjustment scenarios: a “slow burn,” where adjustment is smooth and plays out over a long
period of time, and a “fast burn,” where a sudden revision of the relative growth prospects
of the home versus foreign country leads to a sharp current account reversal.
Our main ﬁnding is that the monetary policy regime has important consequences for
the behavior of domestic variables (for instance, output and inﬂation), but much less so for
international variables (for instance, the current account and real exchange rates). Among
the policy rules we have examined, the policy rule that seems to work best overall has the
central bank focus on targeting domestic (producer) inﬂation. This policy has the central
bank accept the impact of the currency depreciation on import price inﬂation and instead
focus on adjusting interest rates to keep producer prices stable. As a consequence, during
the slow burn, inﬂation is very modest overall (since the import share of consumption is
small) and aggregate output roughly equals its potential value. During the fast burn, the
39rule has each central bank adjust its policy rate rapidly to oﬀset the sudden reallocation of
demand across countries. This serves to dampen signiﬁcantly the eﬀect on aggregate output
and inﬂation. One important caveat, though, is that the moderate aggregate behavior masks
an ineﬃciently large sectoral reallocation. Due to the nominal rigidities, nontradable output
falls signiﬁcantly below its potential level, while the reverse happens in the tradable goods
sector.
By contrast, two kinds of monetary regimes work very poorly during a current account
reversal: targeting consumer-price inﬂation and targeting the exchange rate. Each of the
policies induces the home central bank to raise interest rates sharply to fend oﬀ a currency
depreciation. This sharp increase in interest rates, in turn, leads to a major contraction in
aggregate economic activity within the home country. The contraction is particularly severe
in the nontradable goods sector, enhancing the ineﬃcient sectoral reallocation.
While the response of domestic variables tends to be quite sensitive to the monetary policy
regime, the same is not true of international variables. In most instances, the behavior of the
current account and the real exchange rates does not vary signiﬁcantly from what a ﬂexible-
price model would predict. Indeed, this is largely true even in an extreme case where the
foreign country implements an exchange-rate peg. In this case, the eﬀect of the peg is largely
absorbed by the foreign economy.
Our benchmark model allows for perfect pass-through of exchange rates to import prices
but is calibrated to match pass-through to ﬁnal consumer prices at the annual frequency.
We show, however, that the main results are robust to allowing for imperfect pass-through
to capture the quarterly dynamics of exchange rates and import prices. Under the slow
burn scenario, the degree of pass-through has little impact on economic behavior. Under
the sudden stop however, current account adjustment is much slower with imperfect pass-
through and the output contraction is much steeper in the baseline case where each central
bank obeys a simple Taylor rule. As in the case of perfect pass-through, however, domestic
inﬂation targeting appears to have desirable stabilizing properties in the event of a current
account crisis. Consumer-price inﬂation targeting, though, is not as harmful as under perfect
pass-through.
Finally, our model is designed to be suﬃciently simple to aﬀord qualitative insights, but
a tt h es a m et i m et ob es u ﬃciently rich to give “ballpark” quantitative predictions. Next on
the agenda is adding features that will improve the quantitative dimension.
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Figure 1: U.S. Current Account and Real Exchange Rate
(Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).















































































































STICKY PRICES FLEXIBLE PRICES
DOMESTIC VARIABLES








Figure 2: Baseline Taylor Rule — Slow Burn Scenario.
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Figure 3: Baseline Taylor Rule: Fast Burn Scenario.
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Figure 4: Domestic Inﬂation Targeting.
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Figure 5: Fast Burn Scenario under Two Diﬀerent Policy Rules.
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Figure 6: Foreign Exchange Rate Peg.


















































Figure 7: China - Recent Trends in GDP Growth and Inﬂation.
(Source: DLX/Haver Analytics).



































































































































Figure 8: Imperfect Pass-Through (Baseline Taylor Rule).
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Figure 9: Imperfect Pass-Through (1992 ERM Crisis and Model).
(Source: IMF International Financial Statistics).
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Figure 10: Imperfect Pass-Through - DPI vs. CPI Inﬂation Targeting.
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